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Malebranche’s Alleged Idealism
Introduction
Over the span of eleven years (1683-1694), Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld,
two prominent sympathizers of the Cartesian tradition, engaged in a rigorous debate. In his initial
set of criticisms, Arnauld objects that a natural consequence of Malebranche’s theory of ideas is
idealism.1 This charge of idealism has puzzled scholars: why did Arnauld believe this? Han
Adriaenssen2 has convincingly argued that Arnauld’s charge of idealism is founded on the
representationality of Malebranchean ideas. According to Arnauld, ideas represent for
Malebranche in much the same way that portraits do—by inciting a perceiver to form a
conception of whatever they pertain to. The portrait of Louis XIV, for example, represents the
French monarch by inciting a conception that pertains to him in a perceiver. However, a portrait
will only represent Louis XIV to a perceiver that is already familiar with the king. Only then will
the conception of Louis XIV arise in a perceiver that actually pertains to him.
Similarly, then, an idea of the sun will only represent it to a perceiver with a previous
conception of the sun. But, for Malebranche, the conception of an object requires the perception
of the idea which represents that object. Thus, a perceiver cannot have a conception of the sun
prior to the perception of its idea. Malebranchean ideas accordingly fail to function as
representations of their objects. In order for Malebranchean ideas to adequately represent an
object to a perceiver, according to Arnauld, a prior conception of that object is required which,
on Malebranche’s own view, is impossible. By failing to represent external objects, moreover,
the ideas in the divine intellect are not just the immediate objects of our perception, but the only
objects of our perception insofar as our perceptual cognition reaches no further than ideas.
Consequently, Arnauld concludes that Malebranche’s view leads to idealism.
Arnauld’s objection, however, presupposes a particular account of representation,
namely, resemblance. For a prior conception of what an idea represents would be required in
order for the idea to actually represent its object only if ideas represented by resembling their
objects as portraits do. This paper will challenge the traditional3 characterization of the
representationality of Malebranchean ideas in terms of resemblance on the grounds that
Malebranche denies both an ontological resemblance as well as an epistemological resemblance
between ideas and external bodies. I argue instead that a careful examination of Malebranche’s
texts, and of the Neoplatonic-Augustinian sources upon which Malebranche bases his theory of
ideas, reveals that Malebranche is not committed to the view that intelligible extension is
representationally related to created bodies by means of resemblance, but rather, by means of an
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exemplary causal relation. On this view, Malebranchean ideas are divine archetypes according to
which particular bodies are created by being the exemplary causes of these bodies. And it is in
virtue of this exemplary causal relation, therefore, that a representational relation is established
between intelligible extension and created bodies. When we interpret Malebranche’s view of
ideational representation this way, the charge of idealism broached by Arnauld, and some recent
commentators4, dissipates. This is because intelligible extension can direct a perceiver to the
individual bodies that are created in accordance with it which does not require a prior conception
of these bodies.
I. The Nature of Intelligible Extension
The upshot of Arnauld’s objection is that Malebranchean ideas fail to function as
representations of their objects. And by failing to represent external objects, moreover, the ideas
in the divine intellect are not just the immediate objects of our perception, but the only objects of
our perception since our perceptual cognition reaches no further than ideas. It is for this reason,
then, that Arnauld believed that Malebranche’s theory of ideas results in idealism. On this basis,
we can understand the idealism whereof Arnauld accuses Malebranche to be an epistemological
one, according to which our cognition is strictly limited to ideas as the sole object of cognition.
Given that there is no viable representational relation between ideas and external bodies on
Malebranche’s view, Arnauld concludes that ideas are no longer signs that cognitively direct us
to bodies, but are themselves the only objects of cognition.
This objection, if correct, proves disastrous for Malebranche’s theory of ideas, as well as
its concomitant doctrine of the Vision in God. However, Arnauld’s objection appears to rest
upon two important sets of assumptions. The first regards the nature of the ideas in God. Arnauld
seems to think that there are individual ideas in God each of which represents a particular body
so that, for example, there is in the divine intellect an idea of the sun, another of a horse, yet
another of a tree, each of which represent the sun, a horse, and a tree, respectively. Additionally,
Arnauld presumes that Malebranchean ideas are images or pictures. Arnauld therefore
understands Malebranche to hold an imagistic conception of ideas whereby ideas present their
content in the form of images. The second assumption regards the nature of the
representationality of ideas. That is, Arnauld assumes that there is an analogy between the way
ideas are representationally related to their objects and the way portraits are, namely, by means
of resemblance. In what follows, I will address each of Arnauld’s assumptions in turn.
As regards the assumption about the plurality of ideas, Malebranche explicitly denies this
given that the objects we perceive in sense perception are perceived in God. This is
Malebranche’s (in)famous doctrine of the Vision in God. Through this doctrine, Malebranche
strips the mind of ideas and thus the capacity for representing external bodies to itself. Rather,
God alone has this capacity for representing bodies. This is because only God can “eminently”
contain all the perfections of bodies. In order for something to eminently contain the perfections
of another being, and thus represent that being, on Malebranche’s view, it must satisfy the
following two criteria. The first criterion is substitutability. That is to say, that which eminently
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contains the perfection of another being must both lack the perfection as it ‘formally’ (i.e.,
actually) exists, yet contain something that “is such that it can stand in the place of such [a
perfection].”5 The second criterion is intelligibility. According to this criterion, something is
intelligible just in case it grounds the nature of the being whose perfection it contains. Particular
things as such, then, are unintelligible because they are not the ground of their own being nor of
the being of another thing—they depend on something else, namely, God, not just for their
existence, but more importantly, for their nature, that is, to be the kind of thing they are. It
follows from the intelligibility criterion that whatever eminently contains the perfections of
another being thereby constitutes the archetype or essence of that being.
Now, only God can satisfy the two criteria of eminent containment. Therefore, only God
can contain within Himself the ideas or perfections of bodies. But since God is eternal and
immutable, and so incapable of change, and since we perceive bodies as perpetually changing,
Malebranche concludes that God cannot contain a plurality of ideas each of which correspond to
an individual body in the material world. For otherwise we could not, as Malebranche says, “see
this body as sometimes great, sometimes small, sometimes round, sometimes square, if we saw it
through a particular idea that would always be the same.”6 Instead of a plurality of ideas in God,
Malebranche posits a single idea of extension in God, that is, intelligible extension. It is by
immediately perceiving intelligible extension, according to Malebranche, that we have the
perceptions of all possible and created bodies and their (possible or actual) modifications. For
intelligible extension “contains all the perfections, or rather, all the differences of bodies”7 which
are made sensible or “rendered particular” when combined with sensations8. On the basis of
Malebranche’s intelligibility criterion, moreover, intelligible extension constitutes the archetype
or essence of bodies given that intelligible extension is the ground of the nature (viz., extension)
of particular bodies, or in other words, bodies derive their extended natures from intelligible
extension.
But what does it mean for intelligible extension to be, or contain, a ‘substitute’ for bodies
and their properties? To put this differently, in what way does intelligible extension contain all
the perfections of bodies, so as to constitute the archetype of extension, without itself being
extended? In the course of their correspondence, Malebranche tells Arnauld that the idea of
intelligible extension is “the idea of length, breadth and depth” without being “itself long and
broad and deep”.9 This description of intelligible extension suggests that, while it is not the case
that intelligible extension is itself extended in length, breadth, and depth, nevertheless,
intelligible extension is the concept or blueprint of extension. In this way, the idea of intelligible
extension contains the definitions of all possible bodies and their infinite variations, in terms of
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the properties of which they are capable, that constitute the rules according to which external
bodies along with their properties can be created. So, for example, intelligible extension, as the
divine concept of extension, contains the definition of a triangle in addition to all the possible
configurations that various triangles can have. Intelligible extension thus serves as the blueprint
of all possible triangles in that it provides a set of rules or directions for constructing any
particular triangle.
This is what Malebranche means in his frequent description of intelligible extension as
the “eternal model or archetype” of created bodies10. That is, intelligible extension is the model
or archetype of created extension in the sense of containing a set of specifications for
constructing any particular body11. So, despite intelligible extension not formally containing the
perfections of bodies, it is nonetheless the blueprint of created extension insofar as it contains the
concepts or definitions of bodies which constitute the rules for constructing particular bodies.
And through His divine omniscience, God is able to know in intelligible extension at once any
and all possible bodies and their properties which He consults in order to create particular bodies.
It must be noted, however, that for Malebranche the idea of intelligible extension does
not consist of separate and discrete logical concepts in the same way that the material world
contains separate and discrete bodies. That is to say, the definitions of bodies contained in
intelligible extension are not “positioned” in the intelligible world as bodies are positioned in the
material world. So, for example, the concept of the sun does not occupy a certain area of
intelligible extension which is positioned in a certain (ideal) distance away from the concept of
the earth12. To attribute this conception of intelligible extension to Malebranche would be to
assume with Arnauld that intelligible extension consists of image-like entities.
But as the model of the material world, intelligible extension consists of a system of
interrelated geometrical definitions of every possible body, rather than a series of pictures.
Intelligible extension contains the geometrical definitions of the sun, the earth, and every other
planetary body, for instance, as conceptual aspects of the general definition of extension which
just is that which contains the generative definitions of all possible bodies. This gives us a sense
of what Malebranche means when he says in Elucidation X that, “[s]ince the parts of intelligible
extension are all of the same nature, they may all represent any body whatsoever.”13
Malebranche does not mean that intelligible extension is itself entirely uniform or homogenous
in the sense of containing nothing other than a blank canvas wherein God can draw out, as it
were, any body whatsoever through it. Instead, Malebranche means that the idea of intelligible
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extension contains the geometrical definitions of each and every possible body as interrelated
conceptual aspects of the general definition of extension.
Indeed, this is precisely Malebranche’s sense of the generality of the idea of intelligible
extension. The conceptual definitions of all possible bodies are contained in an irreducible unity
which transcends a mere collection of particulars, that is, without there being in God a collection
of particular ideas which have a one-to-one correspondence with these bodies14. The general idea
of intelligible extension is not, as some commentators understand it, a bare abstraction from
particulars what is common to all of them, but rather, contains the definition of every possible
body in one united whole15. Intelligible extension contains, as Daisie Radner says, “all the
generative definitions for particular triangles construed as a single definition.”16
II. A Resemblance Theory of the Representational Relation?
Up to this point, we have been considering Malebranche’s account of the nature of the
idea of intelligible extension. In doing so, Arnauld’s assumptions regarding its nature—namely,
that intelligible extension consists of many individual ideas of bodies, on the one hand, and that
these ideas are images of bodies, on the other—have been shown to be inaccurate. For, on
Malebranche’s view, intelligible extension consists of a single general idea of extension which
eminently contains all the perfections of bodies, that is, the generative definitions of bodies, in a
purely conceptual way. Having done so, we can now move on to the second of Arnauld’s
assumptions concerning the representationality of intelligible extension.
Recall that Arnauld appears to presuppose that the representational relation between the
idea of intelligible extension and created bodies is based on resemblance. For intelligible
extension to represent bodies via resemblance, it would have to share certain properties with
bodies. Now, there are two different ways in which intelligible extension can ‘share properties’
with created bodies so as to resemble them. First, there is an ontological resemblance according
to which intelligible extension formally shares properties with created bodies. In order for
intelligible extension to resemble created bodies in this sense, intelligible extension would have
to be material, and so would resemble created bodies by having in itself the extended properties
exemplified by bodies. Second, there is a pictorial resemblance according to which the content
of the idea of intelligible extension consists of images which exemplify properties that are
formally contained, or physically manifested, in created bodies. In this sense, intelligible
extension resembles created bodies insofar as bodies are merely copies or duplicates of these
images in intelligible extension. This appears to be the version of resemblance that Arnauld
assumes grounds the representational relation between intelligible extension and created bodies:
“[t]his alleged archetype of the Sun, will it be able to represent the sun to me in another way than
the portrait of the king represents the king to me? I do not see that it could be otherwise.”17
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Neither of these senses of resemblance, however, is sufficient for explaining
Malebranche’s view of the representational relation between intelligible extension and created
bodies. On the one hand, ontological resemblance cannot explain the representational relation
because, as previously discussed, intelligible extension does not formally contain bodies.
Malebranche vehemently denies that intelligible extension is itself extended, for this would
imply that God is Himself extended. On the other hand, in order for a pictorial resemblance to
adequately ground a representational resemblance, intelligible extension would have to consist of
images which pictorially depict created bodies and their properties. That is to say, pictorial
resemblance relies on an imagistic conception of intelligible extension. As discussed above,
however, Malebranche does not conceive of intelligible extension as containing images or
pictures of created bodies, but rather, as containing the definitions of created bodies which
constitute the rules for constructing them. It follows, then, that this pictorial resemblance cannot
ground the representational relation between intelligible extension and created bodies.
III. The Representational Relation of Exemplary Causation
It is clear at this point that both of Arnauld’s assumptions regarding, on the one hand, the
nature of intelligible extension as consisting of individual pictures in the divine intellect, and on
the other hand, the representational relation between intelligible extension and created bodies as
grounded on resemblance, are unfounded. But it has yet to be determined what does ground this
representational relation. In what remains, I will argue that for Malebranche the representational
relation between intelligible extension and created bodies is grounded on a relation of exemplary
causation.
The notion of exemplarity has its roots in the Platonic tradition, indeed in Plato himself,
and is developed by the Christian Neoplatonists—particularly, Augustine and Ficino—with
respect to the ontological issue of God’s creation of material bodies, as well as the
epistemological issue of the representational relation between the Idea in the divine intellect and
created bodies. As a species of causality, exemplary causation is the causal influence exercised
by a model or an exemplar on the operation of an agent which is in the mind of the agent prior to
the creation of a thing. For example, when an artist creates a sculpture, the artist has in mind an
exemplar or model of the statue beforehand which influences the artist’s act of creating the
statue. This blueprint of the statue in the mind of the artist is the exemplary cause of the statue.
According to both Augustine and Ficino, there is an ontological relation established
between the divine ideas and created bodies in God’s act of creation which consists in an
exemplary causal relation. For the divine ideas constitute the models or exemplars which
determine God’s act of creating particular bodies. In addition to this ontological relation based
on exemplary causation, however, there is also an epistemological relation between divine ideas
and created bodies grounded in exemplary causation. This is because it is by means of the
exemplary causal relation between divine ideas and created bodies that God is able to know or
perceive in Himself the bodies created in accordance with the divine exemplars. In other words,
the exemplary causal relation establishes a further representational relation in virtue of which
God is cognitively related to created bodies by contemplating the divine exemplars contained in
His intellect in accordance with which bodies are constructed.
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As an Oratorian in seventeenth-century France, Malebranche would have been familiar
with these important Church figures, and clearly derived much inspiration on matters concerning
intelligible extension from them as evidenced by his own proclamation that his view of
intelligible extension is Neoplatonist or Augustinian in spirit.18 Indeed, this Neoplatonist position
can also be found in Malebranche’s texts, and evidently supported by the same reasons that it is
in Augustine and Ficino. In the Dialogues on Metaphysics, Malebranche explicitly endorses the
view that the representational relation is established by the exemplary causal relation between
intelligible extension and created bodies. In Dialogue VII, Theodore tells Aristes to,
“Contemplate intelligible extension, the archetype of bodies. This represents them, as it is on its
basis that they have all been formed.”19 Here, Malebranche, through his mouthpiece Theodore,
expresses the view that intelligible extension is representationally related to created bodies in
virtue of being the archetype and exemplary cause of these bodies.
In Elucidation X of the Search, moreover, Malebranche reiterates the Neoplatonist reason
offered by Augustine and Ficino for positing the representational relation in terms of the
exemplary causal relation, namely, to explain the epistemological relation by means of which
God knows the bodies He has created. As Malebranche says, “God contains in Himself an ideal
or intelligible infinite extension; for since He has created it, God knows extension, and He can
know it only in Himself.”20 Malebranche, like Augustine and Ficino, states that God knows
created bodies by contemplating the idea of them, i.e., intelligible extension, contained within
His intellect. For it is inferior to God’s divine perfection to know things by contemplating them
outside Himself, as this would entail that there is some perfection which God lacks. Thus, God
knows the bodies He has created by contemplating the idea of intelligible extension which
cognitively relates God to created bodies. But what is the nature of this representational relation
that cognitively relates God to His material creatures? Malebranche suggests in this passage that
God knows created bodies in intelligible extension since these bodies are created on the basis of
intelligible extension as their model or archetype. In other words, because the idea of intelligible
extension is the exemplary cause of created bodies, it is the exemplary causal relation between
intelligible extension and created bodies that cognitively relates God to these bodies when He
contemplates the idea of intelligible extension in Himself.
Recall that for Malebranche the general idea of intelligible extension is the blueprint of
bodies. That is, intelligible extension contains the interrelated definitions of all possible bodies,
which consist in the rules or specifications for constructing these bodies, in a simple unity that
transcends a mere collection of (abstract) particulars. By containing the definitions of all possible
bodies as the means for constructing them, the idea of intelligible extension thus constitutes the
exemplary cause of bodies. Moreover, the idea of intelligible extension shares a representational
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relation with individual created bodies as a result of the exemplary causal relation that is
established between intelligible extension and bodies when God consults this idea, as a blueprint,
in the creation of particular bodies. In other words, when God consults the general idea of
intelligible extension in order to create particular bodies, He contemplates the definitions of
bodies contained in intelligible extension which constitute the rules or specifications that direct
the creation of these bodies. Upon the creation of some particular body, an exemplary causal
relation is established which pins the general idea of intelligible extension as the exemplary
cause to that particular body. The same holds with respect to each and every particular body
created in accordance with intelligible extension as its exemplary cause. In this way, then, the
exemplary causal relation establishes a representational relation between intelligible extension
and each body created on the basis of the interrelated definitions contained in this general idea as
exemplary cause.
Now, it must be emphasized that, for Malebranche, the exemplary causal relation is to be
distinguished from the efficient causal relation. For although both of these relations in general
involve a causal relationship between God and His creatures, the nature of these causal relations
differ. The first difference consists in their distinct causal relata. The relata involved in the
efficient causal relation are created bodies and the Divine Will. Those involved in the exemplary
causal relation, by contrast, are created bodies and the Divine Intellect. Malebranche makes this
distinction when he says that God knows bodies in His intellect, whereas He sees that they exist
in His will21.
The second difference concerns the distinguishability or individuation of bodies. The
efficient causal relation suffices only to explain the actual existence of a body—and in this
respect the efficient causal relation is the same for any and all created bodies, such that created
bodies are not distinguishable simply on the basis of their efficient causal relation with the
Divine Will. In other words, there is nothing about God’s volitional act of bringing bodies into
existence itself that determines the individuality of bodies: it is, as the Neoplatonists say, only
the unfolding of the divine idea22.
The exemplary causal relation, by contrast, accounts for the individuality of each created
body insofar as the idea of intelligible extension qua exemplary cause contains the unique
definitions of every possible particular body. For it is in virtue of these definitions, which consist
of the rules or specifications for the construction of particular bodies with respect to their
properties and relations, that bodies can be distinguished from one another. Intelligible extension
thus exemplifies the individuality of bodies which is reflected in creation when God consults this
idea in order to direct His will in creating bodies. So, for example, although the efficient causal
relation establishes the existence of a horse and a chair, it does not by itself explain the
individuality of these bodies. Rather, it is the exemplary causal relation that explains the
individuality of the horse and the chair given the definitions of these bodies contained in
intelligible extension by means of which God can distinguish them from one another and from
all other bodies.
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This view is a consequence of Malebranche’s subscription to intellectualism with respect
to God’s act(s) of creation according to which God creates by consulting an idea or reason which
serves as the exemplary cause that directs His will in creating individual bodies. On this view,
primacy is placed on the divine intellect over the divine will in explaining the creation of
individual bodies. This is contrasted with a voluntarist position according to which God acts by
means of an indifferent will. According to voluntarism, there is nothing over and above the
divine will which directs or explains God’s creative activity. God creates this or that body simply
because He wills to do so without any recourse to some further idea.
I will conclude by discussing how this account resolves the charge of epistemological
idealism directed at Malebranche by Arnauld. In order to resolve this charge, it must be
explained how a representational relation based on exemplary causation can cognitively direct a
perceiver of intelligible extension to a particular body in the external world. This can be
explained by referencing the way in which God is cognitively directed to particular created
bodies by contemplating intelligible extension. For just as God is cognitively directed at a
particular body when he contemplates intelligible extension because of the representational
relation established by the exemplary causal relation, so also is a finite mind that perceives a
particular body through intelligible extension in sense perception cognitively related to that body
as a result of the exemplary causal relation it has with intelligible extension.
The definitions contained in intelligible extension, which are sensibly perceived by the
mind in sense perception, constitute the exemplary causes of particular bodies such that there is
an exemplary causal relation established between intelligible extension and particular bodies
when God creates bodies in accordance with them. Accordingly, when the finite mind sensibly
perceives the definitions contained in intelligible extension, though the mind does not perceive
created bodies as they are in themselves, nevertheless the mind is cognitively or
representationally directed to the particular bodies that are created in accordance with them in
virtue of the exemplary causal relation. The sensory perceptions of finite minds and God’s divine
contemplation both involve a kind of perception of intelligible extension. And so, just as God is
cognitively directed at particular bodies by contemplating intelligible extension in virtue of the
exemplary causal relation, so also is the mind cognitively directed at particular bodies when it
sensibly perceives intelligible extension in virtue of the exemplary causal relation. On this
account, then, the mind is cognitively directed to particular created bodies when it perceives
intelligible extension in such a way that does not require the mind to have a previous conception
of these bodies. For the mind’s conception of a particular body in sense perception presupposes a
perception of the definition pertaining to that body contained in intelligible extension, by means
of which the mind is cognitively directed to the particular body via the exemplary causal relation,
which cannot be acquired prior to the perception of intelligible extension.

